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HOFSTRA JAW REVIEW
Volume 6, No. 2

Winter 1978

DEMANDING HUMAN RIGHTS:
A CHANGE IN THE WORLD
LEGAL ORDER
Eric Lane*
The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. Peoples more
numerous and more politically aware are craving, and now demanding, their place in the sun-not just for the benefit of their
own physical condition, but for basic human rights.'
-PRESIDENT

CATER

President Carter's recognition of universal standards of human
rights, 2 and his formulation of a foreign policy at least partially

based on such recognition, 3 has been the object of both foreign and
domestic criticism, 4 which at first glance'appears inexplicably severe. In the context of the present world legal order,5 however,
the administration's expressed intention to pursue a policy directed
toward a worldwide guarantee of human rights represents a poten-

tially radical departure from the legal tenets which have governed
world political interaction for the last 300 years. 6
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., 1965,
Brown University; M.A., 1966, S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook; J.D., 1970, Fordham University.
1. Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 87, 88 (Jan. 20, 1977).
2. See notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text.
3. See text accompanying notes 95-98 infra.
4. See notes 100 & 101 infra and accompanying text.
5. For the purposes of this article the "world legal order" refers to the authority
system under which world parties act and upon which world parties depend for authority and justification for their actions. The vitality of the world legal order depends on a consonance of the world legal order with world political realities; in turn,
the world legal order shapes these political realities. For an excellent discussion of
the world legal order, see Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in I THE FUTuRE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER: TRENDS AND PATTERNS 32 (R. Falk & C. Blackburn eds. 1969).

6. The 300-year period commenced with the termination of the Thirty Years
War in 1648. See note 7 infra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[6: 269

7
These tenets, formalized by the Peace of Westphalia, com-

mand in substance that "apart from obligations undertaken by
treaty, a state is entitled to treat both its own nationals and stateless persons at discretion and that the manner in which it treats
them is not a matter with which International Law, as a rule, concerns itself."8 The post-Westphalia world legal order, which

evolved in opposition to the centralized spiritual and secular domination of the medieval world, ultimately compelled the creation of
these tenets by its strict adherence to a decentralized world model
inhabited by independent and juridically equal states. Cast in response to changing individual and community needs and demands, 9
the new decentralized legal order of the Peace of Westphalia provided a framework in which these changing political realities could

be accommodated. Political realities today, however, differ dramatically from those of the midseventeenth century. Two World Wars,

modern technology, and mass communications, as well as a recognition of decreasing global resources, have narrowed humankind's

divergent characteristics and have increasingly created an interdependent world. 10 Nonetheless, the order of Westphalia, with its

emphasis on decentralization, remains the present world legal arrangement. As described by Professor Falk:
The basic coordinates of the present world order system are contained in the Peace of Westphalia which brought the Thirty
Years War to an end in 1648. According to Westphalia logic, the
world order system is constituted exclusively by the governments
of sovereign states. These governments have complete discretion

7. The Peace of Westphalia marked the formal termination of the Thirty Years
War. It incorporated two treaties: the Treaty of Munster, executed at Munster in 1648
by Austria, Spain, and France, and the Treaty of Osnabruch, executed at Osnabruch in 1648 by Austria and Sweden. See generally C. FRUEDRICH, THE AGE or
BAROQUE 1610-1660 (1962); D. OGG, EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
(1960); S. STEINBERG, THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR AND THE CONFLICT FOR EUROPEAN

HEGEMONY 1600-1660 (1966); C. WEDGEWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (1961).
8. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 292, at 641 (8th ed.
H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955). While this statement was not in L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (2d ed. 1912), it does not represent a substantial change
from the general principles set forth in the earlier work.
9. These needs and demands, or more appropriately, political realities, constitute the roots of the world legal order upon which such an order must rely for its
vitality. Thus, destruction of the root will necessarily destroy the system and the
order.
10. For an excellent study of the interdependency of the world and the international legal order and the possible alternatives to this order, see R. FALK, A STUDY
OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975).
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to rule national space (or territory), and can also enter into voluntary arrangements (e.g., treaties) to regulate external relations
and interconnections of various sorts. But these governments are
sovereign and equal by juridical fiat, rather than by virtue of
some higher authority within the world order system. No one
government is entitled to greater formal status than another by
reasons of wealth or power or size. In such circumstances, "law
and order" rests upon the volition of governments and upon
their perception of common interests."
Thus, international recognition and protection of human rights have

not historically been an ingredient of the Westphalian arrangement. Nor perhaps can they be, considering the Westphalian emphasis on territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality. Consequently, individuals are merely the "objects" 12 of the international
legal order and their rights can receive protection only by virtue of
the volition of the individual state. However, demands for the legal
protection of individual human rights have increased and expanded. The purpose of this article is to examine these demands in
the framework of the present world legal order, particularly in light
of President Carter's human rights policy, to determine whether
these demands can be realized peacefully.
THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

The Peace of Westphalia 13 marked the formal termination of
more than thirty years of European warfare which pitted Lutherans
and Calvinists against Catholics and against each other; feudal lords
against feudal kings; nations against the Empire; and more generally, forces for decentralization against forces for continuing secular
and spiritual centralization. 14 This period has been accurately characterized as the beginning of a new world order:
The Peace of Westphalia, for better or worse, marks the end of
an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic
portal which leads from the old into the new world. The old
11. Id. at 59 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
12. See I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATIs E § 290, at 639 (8th
ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
13. See note 7 supra.
14. See generally J. BRONOWSKI & B. MAZLISH, THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL
TRADITION (1960): "This was a war which started in 1618 for religious reasons and
ended in 1648 for political ones; it was a war which saw a Catholic cardinal,
Richelieu, maneuver France onto the side of the Protestant powers in order to defeat
the Catholic Hapsburgs." Id. at 105 (footnote omitted).
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world, we are told, lived in the idea of a Christian commonwealth, of a world harmoniously ordered and governed in the
spiritual and temporal realms by the Pope and Emperor. This
medieval world was characterized by a hierarchical conception
of the relationship between the existing political entities on the
one hand, and the Emperor on the other. . . .In particular the
Reformation and the Renaissance, and, expressive of the rising
urge of individualism in politics, nationalism, each in its own
field, attacked the supreme authority claimed by the Pope and
the Emperor.' 5
The medieval European world was hierarchical in both its spiritual and secular spheres. Furthermore, the spiritual pyramid overshadowed the feudal pyramid and was, at least in theory, supreme
in the event of conflict. Thus, in 1302 Pope Boniface VIII, in his
fight over taxation with Philip IV of France, issued the following
bull:
At the time of the flood there was, indeed, one ark of Noah, prefiguring one Church; it... had one steersman and commander,
namely Noah, and we read that outside of it all things existing
on earth were destroyed ...
. ..[S]piritual power exceeds any earthly power in dignity
and nobility, as spiritual things excel temporal ones....
If, therefore, the earthly power err, it shall be judged by
the spiritual power; if the lesser spiritual power err, it shall be
judged by the higher, competent spiritual power; but if the supreme spiritual power err, it could be judged solely by God, not
by man ....16
As the seventeenth century approached, however, notions of feudal
and papal dominance were more a reactionary assertion of authority
than a relevant arrangement for world order.17 The Reformation
was already fully matured and the scientific revolution was thriving.' 8 On the political front, "the concept of the balance of power
was evolved, and with it the modem notion of a community of
states." 19 Machiavelli had already published The Prince and Bodin
15. Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AMi. J. INT'L L. 20, 28 (1948)
(footnotes omitted).
16. Bull Unam sanctam of Pope Boniface VIII on the Plenitude of the Papal
Power (Nov. 18, 1302), reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES
90, 90-92 (S.Ehler & J. Morrall trans. & eds. 1967).
17. See generally J. BRONOWSKI & B. MAZLISH, supra note 14; D. OGG, supra
note 7; S. STEINBERG, supra note 7; C. WEDGEWOOD, supra note 7.
18. See generally authorities cited note 17 supra.
19. J. BRtONOWSIa & B. MAZLISH, supra note 14, at 21.
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had published Republique Celebration,2 0 both espousing the notion of absolute sovereignty. Economically, the Reformation had
boosted the rising middle class 21 and mercantilism was on the rise,
forcing a growing emphasis on the state as the center of the world
order arrangement.

22

Thus, when Duke John Williams died without heir in 1609,
leading to a war of succession and ultimately to the Thirty Years War
which involved most great powers of the time, 23 the political
realities on which the existing world order was based were so
changed that the hierarchical structure could not accommodate
them. Consequently, there could be no peaceful resolution of a
conflict which otherwise should have been easily resolvable. 24 Essentially, the battle for succession initiated the assertion of three
different interests: religious, economic, and nationalistic. 25 While
the differences between these interests were often blurred by alliances among parties with various opposing interests,2 6 the common denominator and overriding interest in all cases was the decentralization of spiritual and secular authority. 27 The question was
no longer one of interpretation of the rules of the centralized world
legal order, but rather of the validity of the system itself. Transposed into a legal order perspective, the hallmark of this period
was the inability of the centralized legal order to accommodate
changed political realities. The war was a direct result of this failure.
20. The Prince was first published in 1513 and Republique Celebration was
first published in 1578.
21. Another important consequence of the Reformation was its encouragement of the rising middle class. The Reformation, at least in its Calvinist
version, made religion a thing of this world and achieved the miracle of
identifying good works with the accumulation of riches. The shame of profiteering was wiped away and what was formerly lust for wealth became the
fulfillment of God's purposes on earth.
A strengthened nation-state and a rising middle class-these are characteristics of what we have learned to call modem history. If we add to these
what may at first sight appear as contradictory elements, religious and political individualism, we are well on our way to the contemporary world.
J.BRONOWSKI & B. MAZLISH, supra note 14, at 106.

22. "The revolution of political and economic thought and action is all symbolized in the word and concept of the 'state.'" C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 7, at 3.
23. For a general discussion of the immediate events culminating in the Thirty
Years War, see authorities cited note 7 supra. The great powers of the time were the
Empire, including Austria and the German principalities and estates, Spain, France,
and Sweden.
24. S. STEINBERG, supra note 7.
25. For a discussion of these interests, see authorities cited note 7 supra.
26. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
27. S. STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 81-85.
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The treaties ending the war 28 set forth the legal rules for a
new decentralized world legal order and, by so doing, illustrated
the discordance between then existing political realities and the old
centralized arrangement. The Peace of Westphalia, which has been
described as the "reflections of an emergent, widely shared, disparately formulated consensus regarding changed conditions and their
juridical consequences, " 2 9 thus mirrored all the decentralization
interests. It has been noted:
In the spiritual field the Treaty of Westphalia was said to be "a
public act of disregard of the international authority of the Papacy." In the political field it marked man's abandonment of the
idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his option for a
new system characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of
states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another,
30
and free from any external earthly authority.
The treaty recognized the territorial sovereignty of the European
states and established procedures for peaceful resolution of disputes
arising among signatories:
[I]f it happens any point [of this treaty] shall be violated, the
Offended shall before all things exhort the Offender not to come
to any Hostility, submitting the Cause to a friendly Composition,
or the ordinary Proceedings of Justice.
Nevertheless, if for the space of three years the Difference
cannot be terminated by any of those means, all and every one
of those concern'd in this Transaction shall be oblig'd to join the
injur'd Party, and assist him with Counsel and Force to repel the
Injury, being first advertis'd by the injur'd that gentle Means
and Justice prevail'd nothing; but without prejudice, nevertheless, to every one's Jurisdiction, and the Administration of Justice conformable to the Laws of each Prince and State: and it
shall not be permitted to any State of the Empire to pursue his
Right by Force and Arms; but if any difference has happen'd or
happens for the future, every one shall try the means of ordinary
Justice, and the Contravener shall be regarded as an Infringer of
Peace. 3 '
28. See note 7 supra.
29. Falk, A New Paradigmfor InternationalLegal Studies: Prospectsand Proposals, 84 YALE L.J. 969, 979-80 (1975). In this extremely provocative and challenging
article, Professor Falk argues that the world order is already shifting toward a central
guidance arrangement, requiring the imput of a humanistic vision, to avoid world hegemony. Id.
30. Gross, supra note 15, at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
31. Treaty of Westphalia arts. CXXIII & CXXIV (1648), reprintedin MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, at 7, 46-47 (F. Israel ed. 1967).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss2/1

6

19781

Lane: Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order
DEMANDING HUMAN RIGHTS

Embedded in these provisions was the modem notion of "balance of power" which was to become the foundation for the decentralized world order. 32 The Peace of Westphalia also guaranteed
religious tolerance, at least within the Christian world. This tolerance was reflected in the structure of guarantees which were to
operate independent of religion: "[AIll Partys in this Transaction

shall be oblig'd to defend and protect all and every Article of this
Peace against any one, without distinction of Religion . . . ."
Despite the great number of qualifications, reservations, and exceptions, the Peace of Westphalia recognized the modem principle

of separation of church and state. "Politics became secularized, religion was left to the conscience of the individual." 34 In this regard,
the Peace represented a denial of papal authority, as the parties
chose to ignore the papal bull 35 condemning the treaties for their
36
inclusion of clauses granting religious freedom.
The jurisprudential underpinnings of this new legal order were
provided by the work of the Dutch legal philosopher, Hugo
Grotius. In his treatise published in 1625, The Law of War and
Peace,3 7 Grotius rooted decentralized sovereignty in natural law
doctrine,3 s rationalized the absolute power of the sovereign, 3 9 and
32. Gross, supra note 15, at 27-28.
33. Treaty of Westphalia art. CXXIII (1648), reprintedin MAJOR PEACE TREATIES
OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, at 7, 46 (F. Israel ed. 1967).
34. S. STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 80.
35. Bull Zelo domus Dei of Pope Innocent X Condemning the Religious Clauses
of the Peace of Westphalia (Nov. 20, 1648), reprintedin CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH
THE CENTURIES, supra note 16, at 194.
36. See S. STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 83; Gross, supra note 15, at 28. See also
Commentary of the Editors, CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES, supra
note 16, at 193-94.

37. Due to the widespread influence of The Law of War and Peace, Grotius has
been called the "father of international law." This work was first published in Paris
in 1625 and was frequently consulted by the Founding Fathers, including James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and John Marshall. Dumbauld, Preface to
E. DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF HUGO GROTIUS at vii (1969).
38. See Author's Preface to H. GRoTIUs, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (L.

Loomis trans. 1949) (1st ed. Paris 1625). Professor Lauterpacht defined natural law as
that law arising from:
[t]he social nature of man; the generic traits of his physical and mental constitution; his sentiment of justice and moral obligation; his instinct for individual and collective self-preservation; his desire for happiness; his sense of
human dignity; his consciousness of man's station and purpose in life-all
these are not products of fancy but objective factors in the realm of existence.
H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 101 (1950).
39. See H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 44-49 (L. Loomis trans.

1949) (ist ed. Paris 1625).
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generally created rules by which the newly established independent states could coexist. Grotius's writings focused on the creation
of a rationale for the decentralized world legal order resulting from
the changed political realities, and particularly on legal means for
maintaining peace. Thus, it has been noted: "The modern law of
nations as it came into being after the Reformation and as it was
formulated by Grotius and his immediate predecessors, originated
in the historic necessity of regulating the relations of the new sovereign States which
arose on the ruins of the temporal unity of
40
Christendom."
THE GROWTH OF THE DECENTRALIZED LEGAL ORDER

The period between Westphalia and World War I proved fertile for the growth of the decentralized, state-dominated legal order. Inherent in such an order, at least with regard to human
rights, is the tenet that no restraints may be placed on the internal
acts of a sovereign.41
The late seventeenth and early eighteenth century maturation
of mercantilism and attendant international competitiveness further
secured the decentralized system, making more credible existing
claims for absolute sovereignty and more tenuous any restraint on a
decentralized legal order. No longer was there any promise of an
international community of nations subordinated to the law of nations. 42 "[Tihe idea of an international community became an al40. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 38, at 114 (1950). This book remains the most
thoughtful historical study of human rights in international law. However, in reading
it now, almost 30 years after its first publication, it is hard to agree with its optimism
concerning the ability of the state system to accommodate human rights demands;
time has proven this optimism unwarranted.
41. This tenet was foreshadowed and supported by Thomas Hobbes in discussing the rights of citizens in relation to their sovereign: "[T]here is a supreme power
in some one, greater than which cannot by right be conferred by men, or greater than
which no mortal man can have over himself. But that power... we call absolute." T.
HOBBES, DE CIVE OR THE CITIZEN 77 (S. Lamprecht ed. 1949) (1st ed. Paris 1642)
(footnote omitted). "[I]t
follows manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him
who commands, must not be punished." Id. at 76. "It follows therefore that this one,
whether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme power, have
also this right; that he both judge what opinions and doctrines are enemies unto
peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught." Id. (footnote omitted).
42. See W. DORN, COMPETITION FOR EmPIRE, 1740-1763, at 1 (1963):
It is this very competitive character of the state system of modern
Europe that distinguishes it from the political life of all previous and nonEuropean civilizations of the world. Its essence lies in the coexistence of
independent and co-ordinate states, whose expansionist drive provoked incessant military conflicts and periodical reshufflings of the territorial and
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most empty phrase and ... international law came to depend upon
the will of states more concerned with the preservation and expan43
sion of their power than with the establishment of a rule of law."
44
Positivism became the prevalent international legal philosophy to the extent that denial of a natural law authority left sovereign
consensus as the sole basis upon which the world order arrangement rested. 45 The pervasiveness of this theory of international law
is illustrated by Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in The Antelope, 46
a case dealing with the return of captured slaves to foreign traders
despite the illegality of the slave trade in the United States:
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. .

.

. It results from

this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on
another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate
on itself alone. A right, then, which is vested in all, by the consent of all, can be devested only by consent; and this [slave]
trade, in which all have participated, must remain lawful to
those who cannot be induced to relinquish it. As no nation can
prescribe a rule for others, none can make a law of nations; and
this traffic remains lawful to those whose governments have not
47
forbidden it.
Thus, although this period saw the growth in many states of notions of natural rights, such as those expounded in the Declaration
of Independence and the Bill of Rights,4 8 the sanction of these
political map, and above all in the prevention of any single power from reducing the others to a state of permanent subjection. But to be a great power
in 1740 signified the pursuit of an expansionist or imperialistic foreign policy. Every great power was a potential aggressor to its neighbor and since it
knew this neighbor to be inspired by similar motives, it could not but regard
every subtle maneuver of the latter as a potential aggression.
43. 'Gross, supra note 15, at 38.
44. For the purposes of this article, "positivism" refers to acts or commands of
the sovereign which in the international sphere are reflected in treaties.
45. As Professor Gross points out, the theories of Grotius were replaced by
those of Emmerich de Vattel, who
prepared the ground for the era of uninhibited positivism. He helped to establish precisely because of his popularity, perhaps more than any of his
predecessors or successors, the consensual character of international law and
to reduce natural law from the function of supplying an objective basis for
the validity, the binding force, of the law of nations to the function of supplying rules for filling gaps in positive international law.
Gross, supra note 15, at 36-37.
46. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
47. Id. at 122.
48. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 38, at 73-77.
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natural rights remained solely an internal affair, and thus did not
spill over into the international legal order.
THE FAILURES OF THE DECENTRALIZED LEGAL ORDER

The devastation of World War I which affected "not armies
alone, but peoples, and not battlefields alone, but whole continents," 49 engendered a shift in political realities which was reflected in article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations:
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League. In
case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of
such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by
which this obligation shall be fulfilled.50
While this article did not outlaw wars of aggression, it represented
a withdrawal from the perception of war as an end of state. 51 To
the extent that this limitation on states' activities constituted a rule
of international behavior, it failed to create a procedure for the
resolution of conflicts which had previously been resolved by war.
Nevertheless, the willingness of the great powers to discuss the

49.
50.

E. BENDINER, A TIME FOR ANGELS 3 (1975).
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10.

51. "Throughout Europe diplomatic officials came from the same class and all
of them accepted war as a necessary part of the system. In this sense warfare became
a function, if not an actual necessity, of the structure of European society." W. DORN,
supra note 42, at 5. See also Lieber Code art. XXX (1863), reprinted in I THE LAW
OF WAR 158, 164 (L. Friedman ed. 1972) (instructions for governing United States'
armies in field): "Ever since the formation and coexistence of modem nations, and
ever since wars have become great national wars, war has come to be acknowledged
not to be its own end, but the means to obtain great ends of state ....
" Additionally,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S.
No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 58, arguably included a resolution to criminalize wars of aggression. This pact, signed in Paris in 1928, provided in part:
Article I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific
means.
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curtailment of state war action reflected changing political realities
which were fostered by a realization that war could now wreak
worldwide devastation.
While World War I created a demand that resort to war be
limited through international law, World War II forged new concern for human rights and forced recognition that these rights cannot depend on the uncontrolled will of the sovereign state for their
52
protection and sanctity:
The persecutions, expulsions and exterminations of millions
of human beings since World War I has exceeded any denial of
human rights recorded in previous history and has awakened
world opinion to the importance of extending international protection to the individual....
. . . [T]he concept of the sovereignty of the state, and the
growth of powerful sentiments of nationalism in the nineteenth
century obscured the direct relationship between the individual
and the international community. In the twentieth century the
degeneration of the concept of the sovereign nation by ruthless
totalitarian regimes left the individual without protection in
many states and aroused a general sentiment that the international community must find practical means to assure that the
53
state is for man, not man for the state.
Against this background of devastation, in 1945 the International Military Tribunal (the Tribunal) was created. 5 4 The Tribunal
was given jurisdiction over crimes "against peace," which are
analogous to the principles of article 10 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, 55 "war crimes," and " 'crimes against humanity'
whether or not in violation of. . . domestic law." 5 6 "Crimes

52. See generally H. LAUTERPAcHT, supra note 38, at 77-79.
53. Wright, Introduction to L. KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CoRPus at i-ii(1962).
See also H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 38, at 79.
54. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1546, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter cited as Charter of

the International Military Tribunal] (agreement creating International Military Tribunal (the Tribunal) executed by United States, France, Great Britain, and Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, with charter annexed).
55. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
56. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 54, § II. This
section defined crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in con-
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against humanity" were to comprehend acts perpetrated against German nationals, in many cases pursuant to German law. 57 Except that
the victims of "crimes against humanity" were citizens of the same
state as the perpetrators,
"crimes against humanity" were similar to
58

"war crimes."

The willingness to create this new category of

crimes, which allowed representatives of other states to punish citizens of a sovereign state for acts committed within that sovereign
state and against its own citizens, clearly contradicted the rules of
the existing world legal order, 5 9 and reflected changing political
realities regarding human rights. However, if the parties intended
to create an internationally recognized category of "crimes against

humanity" which could be internationally enforced, the short life of
the Tribunal and the restrictions placed on its jurisdiction 60 pre-

cluded realization of this goal. 61 Furthermore, subsequent treaties
and declarations 62 indicated that none of the signatories intended to
restrict generally the powers of states over their own citizens by
incorporating the principle underlying "crimes against humanity"
into international law.63
nection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or

not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Id.
57. See generally Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 Ai. J. INT'L L.
38 (1947) (citing authorities).
58. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 54.
59. Grotius wrote of the right of a sovereign to intervene in a foreign state in
cases of brutal violations of the law of nature, H. GROTIUS, supra note 38, at 262; in
addition, there have arguably been cases of "humanitarian" intervention, see generally E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1921). However, these
cases of intervention have been essentially political in nature and have not institutionalized violations of human rights as criminal.
60. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal limited the Tribunal's
jurisdiction to persons "acting in the interests of the European Axis countries." Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 54, § II.
61. For a general discussion of crimes against humanity, see T. TAYLOR,
NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM (1970).
62. See notes 64-77 infra; text accompanying notes 80-83 infra,
63. Professor Oppenheim argued that there are two sources of international
law: (1) the express consent of states, and (2) the tacit consent of states. The latter,
which he called custom, is a source of law because it describes actions of states performed under the conviction that these actions are obligatory under law. See I L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE

§§ 16-17, at 25-26 (8th ed. H.

Lauterpacht ed. 1955). See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24,
1945, art. 38(I)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, which sets forth as a source of law
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Id. Arguably, crimes against humanity have become part of customary international law, but
the nonintervention clauses, see text accompanying notes 81-83 infra, undermine this
position.
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In addition to the creation of the International Military Tribunal, it is also against the background of World War II's devastation that a number of United Nations documents6 4 relating to the
protection of human rights were drafted. Principal among these
were the United Nations Charter, 65 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 6 6 the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 6 7 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol,6 8 the International Conven69
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide. 70 Furthermore, the Council of Europe sponsored the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; 1 the Ninth International Conference of
American States adopted the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man; 72 and the Council of the Organization of
American States approved a Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 73 and sponsored an American Conven74
tion on Human Rights.
Basic to each of these documents is a recognition "of the inherent dignity of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family"7 5 which "are not derived from the fact that

[they are] national[s] of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of [their] human personalit[ies]. " 76 Moreover, the Universal
64.

For a collection of these documents and others relating to human rights, see

BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (L. Sohn &

T. Buergenthal eds. 1973).
65. See U.N. CHARTER ch. 1, art. 1, para. 3.
66. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A1810, at 71 (1948).

67. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
68. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
69. G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
70. G.A. Res. 260A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948). This treaty came into force
and was registered ex officio Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
71. Nov. 4, 1950, [1953] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 71 (Cmd. 8969), 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
72. May 2, 1948, Basic Documents of the Organization of American States,
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1 (Dec. 1, 1960).
73. May 25, 1960, id. at 9 (amended June 8, 1960).
74. See note 112 infra.
75. Declaration of Human Rights Universal preamble, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
Doe. A/810, at 71-72 (1948).
76. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, Basic
Documents of the Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 1 (Dec. 1, 1960). To Professor Lauterpacht, the inclusion of these
human rights affirmations in the declarations and treaties noted in text constituted
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Declaration of Human Rights reflects an understanding that only

through rules of law can human rights be protected: "Whereas it is
essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human

rights should be protected by the rule of law." 77 However, the
declaration of the need for rules of law to protect human rights

does not make law, nor does it create the mechanism for enforcement of law. Although through these documents human rights have
become part of the world order lexicon, 78 and although their incorporation reflects a recognition of changing political realities regarding human rights, the demand for human rights cannot be satisfied
without providing a means of peacefully protecting individual rights
against the excesses of individual states. 79 Moreover, there is an

inherent danger that this recognition without accommodation will
create greater tension on the legal order.
The core problem with each of these documents is that, with
the exception of the European Convention, 0 they are either declarations, treaties not in force, or treaties in force which fail to pro[t~he renaissance of the law of nature . .. [which] was the unmistakeable result of the urge to find a spiritual counterpart to the growing power of
the modem State. In so far as that power increasingly assumed the menacing
shape of unbridled sovereignty of the State in the international sphere, it
became the promoter of international anarchy and threatened, through the
spectre of modem war, both the rights of man and the heritage of his civilisation.
H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 38, at 112.

77. Universal Declaration of Human Rights preamble, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
Doe. A/810, at 71-72 (1948).
78. See generally F. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WORLD POLITICS: VERBAL
STRATEGY AMONG THE SUPER POWERS (1971). See also Author's Preface to H.

GROTIUS, supra note 38, at 8 (footnote omitted): "Law, however, even lacking the
support of force, is not entirely without influence. For justice brings peace of conscience, and injustice torment and anguish .... Good men unite in praising justice

and condemning injustice."
79.

See I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAwV: A TREATISE § 13a, at 19-20

(8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
80. Nov. 4, 1950, [1953] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 71 (Cmd. 8969), 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). The European Convention provides for a European Commission on Human Rights and a European Court of Human Rights. The
Commission is empowered to receive complaints from individuals and nongovernmental organizations, id. art. 25. The court may only hear cases brought by the
Commission or parties to the Convention, id. art. 44, against states which have
granted the court jurisdiction, id. art. 45. "The High Contracting Parties undertake to
abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are parties." Id. art. 53.
Although states do have a right to refuse the court's jurisdiction, the right of individual petition along with the creation of a court for the adjudication of human rights
disputes represents a partial modification of the world legal order, at least on a regional basis.
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vide an effective mechanism for enforcement, in fact containing
explicit nonintervention clauses which protect and maintain domestic jurisdiction. 81 An example of such a clause is contained in the
United Nations Charter:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the presthe application
ent Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice
82
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
The insertion of such nonintervention clauses was an affirmation of the Westphalian legal order and belied a willingness to give
legal force and effect to the protection of human rights. Thus, it
has been stated in reference to these clauses that "the critical ideas
domestic jurisdicof Westphalia involving sovereign equality and
83
tion are formally perpetuated in the Charter."
81. For example, in referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Professor Oppenheim noted:
As stated by most of the Governments which voted for its adoption, the Declaration is not an instrument which is legally binding either directly or indirectly. In particular, there is no warrant for assuming that it can properly
be resorted to for the interpretation of the provisions of the Charter in the
matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This absence of the element of binding obligation probably explains the willingness of Governments to subscribe to the wide terms of the Declaration.
I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 340n, at 745 (8th ed. H.
Lauterpacht 1955) (footnotes omitted).
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7). See also OAS CHARTER arts. 15, 17. While the
inclusion of nonintervention clauses is a clear expression of Westphalian logic, in the
Americas, the clauses have special meaning given the particular aggressive relationship the United States has had with every member of the American community. See
Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65
MICH. L. REv. 1147, 1151 (1967); Fox, Doctrinal Development in the Americas, 1
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. 44 (1968).
83. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in I THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER:
TRENDS AND PATTERNS 32, 49 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969). Professor Falk also
noted in this essay:
We have mentioned the saving clause in Article 2 (7) of the Charter that
promises to uphold the domestic jurisdiction of states. The idea of domestic
jurisdiction being invested exclusively in national governments is a prime
element of the Westphalia conception. The abiding strength of this idea is
suggested by the reluctance of states, even on the part of those states most
committed to the growth of a stable system of world order, to entrust international institutions with the capacity to determine what falls within domestic jurisdiction.
Id. at 59-60.
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Despite the hope held for the Charter, 84 the increased concern and activity for the protection of human rights,8 5 and the narrowing distinctions between societies,8 6 the possibility of a peaceful
modification of the world legal order to accommodate the growing
demand for the protection of human rights seems remote, inasmuch as the Westphalian legal tenets have reasserted themselves.
As then-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger indicated in a
speech before the United Nations on September 30, 1976:
With modern communications, human endeavor has become
a single experience for peoples in every part of the planet. We

share the wonders of science and technology, the trials of industrialization and social change, and a constant awareness of the

fate and dreams of our fellow men.
The world has shrunk, but the nations of the world have not
come closer together. Paradoxically nationalism has been on the
rise at the precise time when the most serious issues we all face
can only be resolved through a recognition of our interdependence. The moral and political cohesion of our world may be
eroding just when a sense of community has become indispensable.

Human and civil rights are widely abused and have now

87
become an accepted concern of the world community.

84.

See, e.g., I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATIsE § 292, at

641-42 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955) (footnotes omitted):
And although none of these developments have had the legal effect of incorporating the fundamental rights of man as part of the positive law of nations, they are not without significance for this aspect of International Law.
It is probable that the Charter of the United Nations, with its repeated recognition of "human rights and fundamental freedoms," has inaugurated a
new and decisive departure with regard to this abiding problem of law and
government. In some instances-as, for example, in the European Convention on Human Rights-that development has assumed the complexion of
explicit rules legally binding upon States.
85. For example, the 1977 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Amnesty International, an international nongovernmental human rights organization which works for
release of political prisoners. The citation read:
In a world of increasing brutality, internationalization of violence, terrorism
and torture, Amnesty International used its forces for the protection of
human values. Its efforts on behalf of defending human dignity against violence and subjugation have proved that the basis for peace in the world
must be justice for all human beings.
1977 Nobel Peace Prize Citation to Amnesty International, reprinted in Letter from
A. Whitney Ellsworth, Chairman, Amnesty International USA, to Contributors (1977)
(on file at the office of the Hofstra Law Review).
86. See G. FEINBERG, THE PROMETHEUS PROJECT 3 (1969).

87. Toward a New Understanding of Community, Address by Henry A. Kis-
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With regard to human rights, the thirty years following World
War II witnessed expanded expectation and diminished promise as

sovereigns have justifiably felt their authority challenged. For at
the heart of the claim for human rights is
the assertion of the value and of the freedom of the individual as
against the State; the view that the power of the State and of its

rules is derived ultimately from the assent of those who compose
the political community, and the insistence that there are limits
to the power of the State to interfere with man's right to do what

s8
he conceives to be his duty.

It is this "insistence," juxtaposed against the unwillingness of
the Westphalian legal order to accommodate it, which results in

what Dr. Kissinger has characterized as the eroding "moral and
political cohesion of our world."8s 9 In this context, states' continual

declarations concerning their interest in the protection of human
rights, -without the creation of a mechanism for their protection,
are at best "inefficacious, deceptive and, in the long run, a brake
upon progress." 90 To restate the point from a broader perspective,
singer, United States Secretary of State, Before the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 30, 1976), repinted in OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES,
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE (1977).
88. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 38, at 80-81.
89. Toward a New Understanding of Community, Address by Henry A. Kissinger, United States Secretary of State, Before the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 30, 1976), reprinted in OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES,
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE (1977). While Dr. Kissinger
recognized this erosion as a major problem, his response is in the traditional
Westphalian mode:
The United States believes that the future of mankind requires coexistence with the Soviet Union. Tired slogans cannot obscure the necessity for
a more constructive relationship. We will insist that restraint be reciprocal,
not just in bilateral relations but around the globe. There can be no selective
detente. We will maintain our defenses and our vigilance. But we know that
tough rhetoric is not strength; that we owe future generations more hopeful
prospects than a delicate equilibrium of awesome forces.
Peace requires a balance of strategic power. This the United States will
maintain. But the United States is convinced that the goal of strategic balance is achievable more safely by agreement than through an arms race.
The negotiations on the limitation of armaments are, therefore, at the heart
of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Id.

90. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 38, at 74. Professor Lauterpacht believes that
"[i]nasmuch as, upon final analysis, [the law of nature and natural rights] are an
expression of moral claims, they are a powerful level of legal reform. The moral
claims of today are often the legal rights of tomorrow." Id. While the author of this
article agrees with Professor Lauterpacht's belief, the concern here is the nature of
the conversion from moral claims to legal rights.
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if Westphalia has meaning for today, the failure or inability of the
world legal order to accommodate present demands for human
rights protection deprives the order of its moral authority and converts it to a mere obstacle in the path of changing political realities.
Assuming the validity of this proposition, again in light of the
Westphalia parallels, the preeminent foreign policy question for
today is simply whether the demands for human rights protection
can be peacefully realized.
HUMAN

RIGHTS AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

From the inception of his administration, President Carter has
discussed human rights in terms which indicate that he recognizes
that present political realities include demands for the protection of
human rights, 9 ' that there is a need for the accommodation of
these demands, 92 and that any accommodation presents a delicate
and complex problem:
We can only improve this world if we are realistic about its
complexities. The disagreements that we face are deeply rooted,
and they often raise difficult philosophical as well as territorial

issues. They will not be solved easily. They will not be solved
quickly. The arms race is now embedded in the very fabric of
international affairs and can only be contained with the greatest
difficulty. Poverty and inequality are of such monumental scope

that it will take decades of deliberate and determined effort even
to improve the situation substantially. 9 3
91. See Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. Doc. 87 (Jan. 20, 1977). See also President's Address to the General Assembly,
13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 397, 397 (Mar. 17, 1977): "I see a hopeful world, a
world dominated by increasing demands for basic freedoms, for fundamental rights,
for higher standards of human existence."
92. See Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. Doc. 87, 88 (Jan. 20, 1977): "The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping
this new spirit, there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that
is truly humane." See also President's Remarks to People of Other Nations on Assuming Office, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 89, 89 (Jan. 20, 1977): "I want to
assure you that the relations of the United States with the other countries and
peoples of the world will be guided during my own Administration by our desire to
shape a world order that is more responsive to human aspirations."
93. President's Address to the General Assembly, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 397, 397-98 (Mar. 17, 1977). See also President's Address at Commencement
Exercises at the University of Notre Dame, 13 WEEKLY COMsP. OF PREs. Doc. 773,
776 (May 22, 1977):
This does not mean that we conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral
maxims. We live in a world that is imperfect and will always be imper-
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Awareness of the complexity of the problem, however, is not
its resolution. A peaceful resolution of the problem is unlikely to
be forthcoming without an understanding of the lesson of Westphalia: that a substantial change in political realities will result in a
change in the world legal order. As such, the measure of President
Carter's human rights policy is whether he will be able to avoid the
dangerous situation which might result from failing to respond to
the demand for human rights, and yet avoid responding in such a
manner that the proponents of the Westphalia order will see violence as their only means of survival. 9 4 The administration's activities must be examined in this context.
During its first year, the Carter administration criticized various human rights violations, selectively employed statutory tools
which reduce aid to countries that violate certain human rights
standards, 95 signed certain previously unsigned treaties, and committed itself to obtaining the necessary ratification of certain signed
treaties. 9 6 Basic to President Carter's human rights policy has been
the avoidance of direct reliance on natural law principles as the
fect-a world that is complex and confused and which will always be complex and confused.
I understand fully the limits of moral suasion.
94. For a description of a method of change within the Westphalian legal order,

see M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 129 (1961) (footnotes omitted):
In formulating, interpreting and applying the prohibition of impermissible
coercion, authoritative decision-makers of the world community attempt to
regulate conflicting claims by states, on the one hand, to effect changes, and,
on the other, to avoid changes in the patterns of power and other value
allocation among the various nation-states. The decision-makers seek to prevent coercive and violent unilateral modification and reconstruction of value
patterns and, simultaneously, to encourage recourse to nonviolent noncoercive methods of change and adjustment. This policy is instinct with a community recognition that coercion of provocative intensity and violence are
not appropriate instruments for asserting and implementing claims to a reallocation of values; commonly intense coercive and violent unilateral redistribution of values in the world arena not only wastefully entails the expenditure of values for the destruction of values but also generates further value
expenditure and destruction in the shape of a countering response.
95. See text accompanying notes 102-108 infra.
96. See President's Address to the General Assembly, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. DOC. 397, 401 (Mar. 17, 1977):
To demonstrate this commitment, I will seek Congressional approval
and sign the U.N. covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights, and the
covenants on civil and political rights. And I will work closely with our own
Congress in seeking to support the ratification of not only of these two instruments [sic] but the United Nations Genocide Convention and the Treaty
for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well.
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normative basis for its advocacy. Thus, President Carter has taken
a more positivist approach, stating:
All the signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged themselves
to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member
of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens
is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwar97
ranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.
By following this approach,9 the Carter administration, in effect, operates within the framework of the Westphalian legal order,
which relies upon treaties as a source of international law. Despite
this positivist approach, however, the President's policy of repre-

hending foreign governments has been severely criticized by both
domestic9" and foreign sources. 100 Such criticism primarily reflects
97. President's Address to the General Assembly, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
DOC. 397,401 (Mar. 17, 1977). See also Statement by Mark L. Schneider, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations (Oct. 25, 1977), reprinted in OFFICE OF MEDIA SERvICEs, BUREAU

OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE DEPARTMENT OF

(1977):
To those who argue that our concern for human rights of people in other
lands constitutes intervention, we say look to the Charter of the United Nations, to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, to the Helsinki Final
Act, to the Declaration Against Torture, and to similar regional instruments
and resolutions. No nation in the world today can hide torture, apartheid,
arbitrary imprisonment, censorship, or other such violations of human rights
behind assertions of sovereignty. The denials of internationally recognized
human rights and fundamental freedoms is a matter of international concern.
98. In regard to this approach, see Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of InternationalLegal Order, in I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: TRENDS AND PATTERNS 32, 52 (R. Falk & C. Black eds.
1969):
The gradual reorientation of national elites toward the impartial acceptance
of world community legal standards may be the most significant, if occasionally invisible, contemporary trend in support of world order. The Charter conception, by its authoritative formulation of governing norms, is a crucial factor encouraging this trend. The principal organs of the United Nations
often provide communication facilities wherein international adversaries
meet in periods of crisis and violence. Invoking norms to rationalize a national position may lead to a gradual assimilation of the normative directive
as part of what is perceived to be reasonable behavior.
99. See, e.g., Ball, Asking for Trouble in South Africa, ATLANTIC, October 1977,
at 43; Lefever, The Rights Standard, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1977, at 23, col. 2:
1. Giving human rights a central place subordinates, blurs or distorts all
other relevant considerations. After all, the central objectives of our foreign
policy are security and peace....
2. Advocates of the "human rights standard" fail to appreciate the legal
and practical limits of foreign policy. International law forbids any state from
interfering in the internal political, judicial and economic affairs of another.
100. See, e.g., Address by Leonid I. Brezhnev, Chairman, Soviet Communist
STATE
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the tenuous position presently occupied by human rights when balanced against sovereign independence of the Westphalian legal order, which considers security the only international question. 10 ' It
is not that human rights have been entirely ignored by the
Westphalian order, but rather that they have been dealt with in

political, rather than legal, fashion. While the occasional effectiveness of such a political approach cannot be denied, it is selective at

best and does not create legal protection for human rights. Thus,
this approach fails to assure that human rights will become a primary concern of the decentralized Westphalian world legal order.

The tension in the current administration's policy and the
complexity of negotiating it through the Westphalian legal order is

most clearly illustrated by President Carter's use of legislative
tools. Acting pursuant to statute, 10 2 President Carter has selecParty, Soviet Congress of Trade Unions (Mar. 21, 1977), reprinted in part in N.Y.
Times, Mar. 22, 1977, at 14, col. 1:
ITihere are circumstances directly opposed to further improvement of
Soviet-American relations . . . [such as the] direct attempts by official
American bodies to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.
Washington's claims to teach others how to live, I believe, cannot be
accepted by any sovereign state ....
The Soviet Union has always firmly upheld and will uphold its
sovereign rights, its dignity and its interests. At the same time a constructive, realistic approach by the other side will always encounter our understanding and readiness to reach agreement.
101. See, e.g., Toward a New Understanding of Community, Address by Henry
A. Kissinger, United States Secretary of State, Before the 31st Session of the United
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 30, 1976), reprinted in OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES,
BuREAu OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE (1977).

102. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a) (West Supp. 1977). This section provides:
(1) It is the policy of the United States, in accordance with its international
obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping
with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States, to promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. To this
end, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to promote
the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all
countries.
(2) It is further the policy of the United States that, except under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided
to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
(3) In furtherance of the foregoing policy the President is directed to formulate and conduct international security assistance programs of the United
States in a manner which will promote and advance human rights and avoid
identification of the United States, through such programs, with governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights
and fundamental freedoms, in violation of international law or in contravention of the policy of the United States as expressed in this section or otherwise.
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tively denied foreign aid to countries which have "engage[d] in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights."'1 3 Of the fifty-seven countries found, in 1977, pursuant to section 2304(b), to be in "gross violation of internationally
recognized human rights,' 10 4 the Carter administration decided
to reduce aid to only three.105 This reduction in aid based on human
Id.
See also 22 U.S.C. § 2301 (1970), which explicitly sets forth the congressional statement of policy in regard to foreign military assistance and sales. This section provides in relevant part:
The Congress of the United States reaffirms the policy of the United
States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except for individual or collective
self-defense. The Congress finds that the efforts of the United States and
other friendly countries to promote peace and security continue to require
measures of support based upon the principle of effective self-help and
mutual aid. It is the purpose of this subchapter to authorize measures in the
common defense against internal and external aggression, including the furnishing of military assistance, upon request, to friendly countries and international organizations.
Id.
103. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
104. Id, § 2304(d)(1). This section states: "[T]he term 'gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights' includes torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial,
and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person."
Id.
105. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1977, at 1, col. 6. The three countries to which aid
was reduced were Argentina, Uruguay, and Ethiopia. The Department of State report
furnished to Congress contained a list of 82 countries which were receiving some
form of "security assistance." For the statutory definition of this term, see 22
U.S.C.A. § 2304(d)(2) (West Supp. 1977). Of the 82 countries receiving security assistance, only 25 were found to be basically free of violations. N.Y. Times, May 13,
1977, at 1, col. 6. According to 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b) (West Supp. 1977), the Secretary of State must present a report to Congress of human rights practices for each
country for which foreign aid has been proposed. This section provides in relevant
part:
The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress, as part of the presentation materials for security assistance programs proposed for each fiscal
year, a full and complete report, prepared with the assistance of the Coordinator of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to practices
regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized
human rights in each country proposed as a recipient of security assistance.
In determining whether a government falls within the provisions of subsection (a)(3) of this section and in the preparation of any report or statement
required under this section, consideration shall be given to(1) the relevant findings of appropriate international organizations, including nongovernmental organizations, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross; and
(2) the extent of cooperation by such government in permit-
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rights violations, in addition to supporting and reflecting changing
political realities, is an alien currency to this system of aid which
previously exacted only political and military support; as might be
expected, the criticism has reflected this. 10 6 In addition, the selective application of this new legislation has been severely criticized
10 7
by human rights proponents.
Responding to both of these criticisms, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, has explained
the administration's policy:
[W]hat we have tried to do in the human rights issue, and I
think it is a point worth bearing in mind, is to confirm the
American commitment to the notion that this is an idea whose
time has come; that the strength of that idea and its specific
political expression within individual countries really is very
much dependent on the conditions within these countries. We
are not making human rights the condition for dealing with governments. We see movement toward human rights as inherent
in the present evolution of mankind, the rising demands, more
literacy, more communications. All of that is producing many
more demands for human rights and we want to encourage that.
.. . But when we get to specific bilateral discussions of important bilateral issues, we obviously will not make it the precondition or the central issue of our bilateral relations.
• . . You see in South Africa the connection between that
fundamental moral issue and political change both within the
country and externally. The increasing political and social consciousness of the black majority in South Africa is bringing that
issue to the fore in terms of the very nature of South African
society. And internationally, the conjunction between the aspiration for true equality and true opportunity on the part of the
blacks and the black states, the conjunction of this with ideological conflicts, really is posing the challenge that the black-white
conflict could simultaneously become a white-red conflict-if you
will, a conjunction of racial war and ideological war. This is what
transforms a moral issue into an immediate political issue;
whereas in some other places, either domestically or internationting an unimpeded investigation by any such organization of
alleged violations of internationally recognized human rights.

Id.
106. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 18, 1977, at A14, col. 1.
107. See, e.g., Commager, Letter to the Editor (Feb. 25, 1977), N.Y. Times,
Mar. 6, 1977, at A16, col. 5. See also Tonelson, Pitfalls of Morality, NEw REPUBLIC,
October 29, 1977, at 13.
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ally, that issue has not surfaced to some extent. One has to make
one's judgment not only on the basis of what one would like to
see in the world but also in terms of what is actually happening
and where the most pressing issues are surfaced.' 0 8
The complexity of Brzezinski's answer reflects the complexity of the
problem he is trying to solve. On the one hand, he is faced with
changing political realities in the increasing demands for vindication of individual human rights, which he sees as a central world
issue. On the other hand, he is confronted with the traditional
"balance of power" needs generated by the logic of the Westphalian system, which requires nonintervention. His solution to this
dilemma is to opt for the Westphalian security interest, unless the
demand for the accommodation of human rights has reached a
point where the failure to recognize those demands might result in
immediate catastrophe. The core problem with this solution is that
it attempts to accommodate human rights demands through the
political process, without raising them to the level of internationally
protected legal rights. This solution can only create an atmosphere
of confusion and danger.' 0 9 One example of such an atmosphere is
that human rights advocates might regard violence as the only
means of obtaining United States support.
The aspects of the administration's human rights policy most
directed toward accommodating human rights demands in the legal
order are its decision to sign the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the American Convention on Human
Rights, and to seek their ratification along with the ratification of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, and the International Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Racial Discrimination."10 Although none of these
documents, with the exception of the American Convention on
Human Rights, permits the right of individual petition,' 1 or pro108. Osborne, White House Watch, NEw REPUBLIC, October 22, 1977, at 8, 9
(quoting Zbigniew Brzezinski, Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, at
White House press briefing, Sept. 30, 1977).
109. See Sulzberger, Madness in the Method, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1977, at
A23, col. 1.
110. See Statement by Mark L. Schneider, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights, Before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations (Oct. 25, 1977), reprinted in OFFICE OF MEDIA
SERVICES, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, TnE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1977). See
notes 65-74 supra for citations to these documents.
111. President Carter has refused to sign the Optional Protocol to the Interna-
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vides any meaningful mechanism for the adjudication of human
rights disputes, 1 12 the long delay in their execution and ratification
is testimony to Westphalian logic's extraordinary hold on United
States policy. Even a document as compelling and legally unassuming as the Genocide Convention, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1948, was denied Senate ratification as recently as 1974 on the grounds that its ratification constituted a surrender of sovereign power. 1 13 Under Westphalian logic, the danger

of these documents is that they introduce legal order standards
based not on the volition of the sovereign, but on human personality. 1 4 Thus, the minimum human standard set forth in these

documents tends to interfere with the Westphalian notion of sovereign independence. From the perspective of accommodating human

rights demands, however, the danger of these documents is that
the narrowness of their scope will belie any affirmative perception
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides for the individual right
to petition to the Human Rights Committee.
112. The procedure contemplated under each of these documents is for a
Human Rights Committee to make a report concerning claims made to it, and investigated by it, from other State parties who have also accepted the Committee's jurisdiction. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
The American Convention on Human Rights, however, is modeled after the
European Convention; it creates a Human Rights Court and permits some right of
individual petition through its Commission. However, the Convention is not presently in force, and, although ratification by the United States would have significant
regional impact, it would not be the deciding vote. For a general review of the Convention, see Buergenthal, The American Convention on Human Rights: Illusions and
Hope, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 121 (1971); Landry, The Ideals and Potential of the
American Convention on Human Rights, 4 HuMAN RIGHTs 395 (1975).
113. See 120 CONG. REC. 2203 (1974) (remarks of Senator Ervin):
[A]s I construe this very vaguely worded convention, it undertakes to empower the International Court of Justice to overrule the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and even hand down a judgment to the
effect that acts of Congress intended to implement provisions of this treaty
do not constitute a sufficient implementation.
I have never been able to understand why some people think the United
States would be better governed if it were governed by foreigners instead of by American citizens; or why we would have sounder judicial decisions if we empowered the International Court of Justice to overrule the
Supreme Court of the United States, or to make an adjudication that Congress had not complied with the terms of the treaty.
This treaty undertakes to say that every nation which becomes bound by
it shall pass legislation to implement it. So it obligates the United States to
implement with legislation and, at the same time, gives the International
Court of Justice the authority to see to it that the U.S. legislation is sufficient
to enable the United States to perform its duties under the treaty.
114. See notes 75 & 76 supra and accompanying text.
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they create, further diminishing the authority of the Westphalian
legal order without offering a substitute for it.
CONCLUSION

An administration spokesman, in reviewing the administration's human rights policy before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, listed the following as the major accomplishments of its policy: recognition by foreign states and their
citizens of United States concern for human rights; consideration
by foreign states of the cost of repression; a changed worldwide
perception of the United States; the release of some political prisoners; the admission in several foreign states of international organizations for purposes of investigating claims of human rights violations; and the signing of the American Convention. 115 Measured
against current allegations of genocide and the reported worldwide
increase in human rights violations, 116 the administration's claimed
accomplishments appear meek and overstated, and its policy unsuccessful. This need not result from a lack of good faith, but rather
from a world legal order which has traditionally extolled sovereign
independence and has condemned any form of intervention. This
dilemma was reflected in questions recently raised by columnist
James Reston, writing on Cambodia: "Can nothing be done by the
so-called great nations at least to investigate the reports of such
human suffering? Do the sovereign rights of national states include
the power to treat or dispose of their people in any way their temporary rulers decide?" 117 Quite simply, the answer to the important second question is yes, or at least yes until the central nonintervention tenet of the world legal order is replaced. For here the
problem arises, and as long as the legal order continues to regard
the protection of individual human rights as outside its jurisdiction,
the vindication of human rights demands will have to rely on political solutions.
Measured against this standard, President Carter's policy and
accomplishments fare somewhat better. Despite the complexity of
weighing human rights against balance of power, there has been
115. See Statement by Mark L. Schneider, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights, Before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations (Oct. 25, 1977), reprinted in OFFICE OF MEDIA
SERVICES, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1977).
116. Compare AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1 JUNE 1975-31 MAY
with AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1977.

1976

117. Reston, The Tragedy of Cambodia,N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1978, at 27, at col. 1.
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some attempt to modify the world legal order to accommodate demands for the protection of human rights. Particularly interesting
in this regard is the signing of the American Convention.' 1 8 Although this policy provides no remedy to the victims of the present
world legal order, and perhaps especially in the face of the gruesome allegations concerning Uganda and Cambodia, i i 9 the alternatives, given the present legal order and the history of the last thirty
years, are either worse, a matter of degree, or nonexistent. Imagine, for example, the response to a decision by President Carter
to convene an international tribunal to try crimes against humanity
committed in Cambodia, or a decision to have an international
police force land there for the purpose of arresting the perpetrators. To accommodate the changing political realities regarding
human rights in the world order requires a change in the world
legal order. Until individuals are treated as the subject of the world
legal order, and until procedures are provided for the vindication
of their human rights, there can be no adequate safeguards against
the acts of sovereigns perpetrated upon their own citizens. To accomplish this goal, sovereign power must be reduced, and plenary
jurisdiction must be granted to a transnational body. This would, of
course, strike at the heart of the world legal order. However, if the
lessons of Westphalia are valid for today, the failure to accomplish
this goal carries with it the probability of continued human suffering
and the possibility of catastrophic repercussions.
118. See note 112 supra.
119. See, e.g., H. KYEMBA, A STATE OF BLOOD:
AMIN (1977); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1977.
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